1. Agree on a high-level mechanism to improve co-ordination between international actors and Haitian stakeholders (for example on the basis of the political dialogue on governance initiated at the Conference in Washington DC on 14 April 2009).
2. Ensure that the DSNCRP (growth and poverty reduction strategy paper) remains the essential reference document, reflecting a vision and priorities shared by the Haitian government and the international partners;
ensure that it is perceived as a real contract between national and international stakeholders.
3. Ensure that local differences are taken into account when identifying short-term priorities.
4. Encourage joint evaluations and field research that is either conducted jointly or that involves co-ordination.
5. Clarify the definition of the sector projects based on the DSNCRP to enable clearer priorities to be established.
6. To limit brain drain, promote, as good practice, a moratorium on the recruitment of any public servant in the six months immediately after the person concerned has left his or her administrative post.
7. Establish a mechanism for evaluating the immediate results of the DSNCRP. Identify indicators that can measure its impact on social and economic dynamics as well as on the forces underlying governance.
This might involve a mid-term evaluation and then a further evaluation at the end of the period covered by the DSNCRP.
8. Re-establish a strategic plan to strengthen the state (funds are available to support such a programme).
9. Map out priority needs for all essential state commitments, so that the government can develop a very clear grasp of this issue.
10. Identify resources that can be mobilised, especially from taxation. Revive the public fiscal system so as to re-establish the tax base, strengthen social solidarity, and provide people with more extensive services. Expand the means available for the state to resume a strategic operational dimension while reorganising services in the departments.
a. Draw up a framework to develop the private sector so that it is conducive to employment and expanding the tax base. Reduce monopolies in certain economic sectors.
b. Devise a framework for improving the delivery of basic services. The recently adopted justice and security reform plan should be subject to special monitoring.
c. Monitor the listed results of programmes carried out by international actors to strengthen the state, and assess the impact of initiatives related to this goal.
d. Revise legislation dating from the Duvalier period which governs the activities of state bodies so that current control and management requirements can be met. Update the handbook of procedures for each ministry.
e. Develop a public service human resources policy to enhance the status of public servants and ensure their professional loyalty.
f. Implement the anti-corruption strategy prepared by the Anti-Corruption Unit, including setting up anti- corruption offices throughout the country’s different departments and strengthening enforcement of the legal framework.
11. Prepare a road map for progressing from Phase II to Phase III alignment,34 lessen dependency on the PIUs and strengthen monitoring and control facilities.
Principle 1:
Take context as the starting point
Principle 2:
Do no harm
Principle 3:
Focus on statebuilding as the central objective
Priority actions identified by participants at the national consultation included:
34 Phase I: alignment is impossible because of the lack of national and sector strategies, or because the executive is not representative;
Phase II: partial alignment is possible; Phase III: there is no political or major technical barrier to alignment (OECD DAC staff).
12. Strengthen the mechanisms for international organisations to monitor the local context more effectively, so as to better align international aid with the local situation and to consider sub-national and regional issues.
13. Strengthen contingency planning and the ability of the government and international actors to respond rapidly (for example, in the area of food security).
14. Establish a national policy for developing agricultural productivity in regions with strong food-producing po-tential. Expand the road infrastructure in accordance with food security needs. Create an insurance mechanism for protection against sharp rises in world prices.
15. Invest and encourage investment in the social sphere, which is a basic aspect of long-term stabilisation. En-sure that social programmes are funded through long-term mechanisms so that national authorities can steadily re-establish their strategic priorities.
16. Encourage employment programmes that target young people, along with rural development programmes.
17. Launch a dialogue on family planning.
18. Promote reforestation through new legislative incentives. Establish clear land use property rights.
19. Encourage discussions between the executive, legislature and civil society before any strengthening of inter-ministerial capacity.
20. Strengthen inter-ministerial capacity on the basis of the government’s general policy declaration while mak-ing the best possible use of existmak-ing inter-ministerial co-ordination arrangements.
21. Promote an attractive legal framework for foreign investors, especially in the clothing sector. Establish a dialogue between the actors concerned.
22. Strengthen the customs system and regulations.
23. Identify actions in the DSNCRP aimed at reducing poverty. Give priority to executing and promoting these actions while supporting dialogue with the target groups.35
24. Continue to ensure that cases of exclusion are dealt with in programming, in particular through:
a. Re-allocating data on aid management (budgetary allocations, assistance, development indicators) according to the subdivisions in Haitian society (e.g. urban vs. rural, young people, men vs. women).
b. Developing a policy that stimulates engagement in the most neglected or vulnerable departments.
c. Continuing support institutions responsible for fighting discrimination, such as the Ministry for the Condition of Women.
d. Strengthening transparency of the geographical distribution of budgetary allocations and official develop-ment assistance.
25. Develop ways of communicating that are geared to the various subdivisions of Haitian society to strengthen understanding of the procedures of international engagement, as well as commitment and transparency.
26. Support broader alignment at sector and local community levels.
27. Improve co-ordination between international actors through joint missions, joint offices, common reporting arrangements and the use of multi-donor trust funds.
28. Superimpose a bottom-up and participatory approach on the mainly top-down current approach:
a. Jointly develop a methodology for increasing the flow of information coming from the communes.
b. Plan for the establishment at communal level of committees for monitoring and popular consultation (with quorums for women, young people and other vulnerable groups) in order to facilitate local consultation with beneficiaries before, during and after projects.
29. Develop information systems based on standardised data collection so as to improve data management and communication with partners.
30. Provide joint training courses for national and international partners to strengthen mutual understanding of the constraints faced by each, and promote reliance on common standards.
Principle 4:
Prioritise prevention
Principle 5:
Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives
Principle 6:
Promote
non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies
Principles 7-8-9-10:
The practicalities
35 If the social insurance system were strengthened with budgetary support and technical assistance programmes, it could cover 20% of the Haitian population by 2011 (currently 3% are covered by the state and 2% by the private sector).
Annexes
Annex A: Principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations
Preamble
A durable exit from poverty and insecurity for the world’s most fragile states will need to be driven by their own leadership and people. International actors can affect outcomes in fragile states in both positive and negative ways.
International engagement will not by itself put an end to state fragility, but the adoption of the following shared Principles can help maximise the positive impact of engagement and minimise unintentional harm. The Principles are intended to help international actors foster constructive engagement between national and international stake- holders in countries with problems of weak governance and conflict, and during episodes of temporary fragility in the stronger performing countries. They are designed to support existing dialogue and co-ordination processes, not to generate new ones. In particular, they aim to complement the partnership commitments set out in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. As experience deepens, the Principles will be reviewed periodically and adjusted as necessary.
The long-term vision for international engagement in fragile states is to help national reformers to build effective, legitimate, and resilient state institutions, capable of engaging productively with their people to promote sustained development. Realisation of this objective requires taking account of, and acting according to, the following Principles:
1. Take context as the starting point. It is essential for international actors to understand the specific context in each country, and develop a shared view of the strategic response that is required. It is particularly important to recognise the different constraints of capacity, political will and legitimacy, and the differences between: (i) post-conflict/crisis or political transition situations; (ii) deteriorating governance environments, (iii) gradual improvement, and; (iv) prolonged crisis or impasse. Sound political analysis is needed to adapt international responses to country and regional context, beyond quantitative indicators of conflict, governance or institutional strength. International actors should mix and sequence their aid instruments according to context, and avoid blue-print approaches.
2. Do no harm. International interventions can inadvertently create societal divisions and worsen corruption and abuse, if they are not based on strong conflict and governance analysis, and designed with appropriate safeguards.
In each case, international decisions to suspend or continue aid-financed activities following serious cases of cor-ruption or human rights violations must be carefully judged for their impact on domestic reform, conflict, poverty and insecurity. Harmonised and graduated responses should be agreed, taking into account overall governance trends and the potential to adjust aid modalities as well as levels of aid. Aid budget cuts in-year should only be considered as a last resort for the most serious situations. Donor countries also have specific responsibilities at home in addressing corruption, in areas such as asset recovery, anti-money laundering measures and banking transparency. Increased transparency concerning transactions between partner governments and companies, often based in OECD countries, in the extractive industries sector is a priority.
3. Focus on state-building as the central objective. States are fragile when state 36 structures lack political will and/
or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations. International engagement will need to be concerted, sustained, and focused on building the relationship between state and society, through engagement in two main areas. Firstly, supporting the legitimacy and accountability of states by addressing issues of democratic governance, human rights, civil society engagement and peacebuilding. Secondly, strengthening the capability of states to fulfil their core functions is essential in order to reduce poverty. Priority functions include: ensuring security and justice; mobilising revenue;
establishing an enabling environment for basic service delivery, strong economic performance and employment
36 The term “state” here refers to a broad definition of the concept which, includes the executive branch of the central and local governments within a state but also the legislative and the judiciary arms of government.
generation. Support to these areas will in turn strengthen citizens’ confidence, trust and engagement with state institutions. Civil society has a key role both in demanding good governance and in service delivery
.
4. Prioritise prevention. Action today can reduce fragility, lower the risk of future conflict and other types of crises, and contribute to long-term global development and security. International actors must be prepared to take rapid action where the risk of conflict and instability is highest. A greater emphasis on prevention will also include sharing risk analyses; looking beyond quick-fix solutions to address the root causes of state fragility; strengthening indigenous capacities, especially those of women, to prevent and resolve conflicts; supporting the peacebuilding capabilities of regional organisations, and undertaking joint missions to consider measures to help avert crises.
5. Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives. The challenges faced by fragile states are multi-dimensional. The political, security, economic and social spheres are inter-dependent. Importantly, there may be tensions and trade-offs between objectives, particularly in the short- term, which must be addressed when reaching consensus on strategy and priorities. For example, international objectives in some fragile states may need to focus on peacebuilding in the short-term, to lay the foundations for progress against the MDGs in the longer-term. This underlines the need for international actors to set clear measures of progress in fragile states. Within donor governments, a “whole of government” approach is needed, involving those responsible for security, political and economic affairs, as well as those responsible for development aid and humanitarian assistance. This should aim for policy coherence and joined-up strategies where possible, while preserving the independence, neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian aid. Partner governments also need to ensure coherence between ministries in the priorities they convey to the international community.
6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies. Real or perceived discrimination is associated with fragility and conflict, and can lead to service delivery failures. International interventions in fragile states should consistently promote gender equity, social inclusion and human rights. These are important elements that underpin the relationship between state and citizen, and form part of long-term strategies to prevent fragility.
Measures to promote the voice and participation of women, youth, minorities and other excluded groups should be included in state-building and service delivery strategies from the outset.
7. Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts. Where governments demonstrate political will to foster development, but lack capacity, international actors should seek to align assistance behind government strategies. Where capacity is limited, the use of alternative aid instruments – such as international compacts or multi-donor trust funds – can facilitate shared priorities and responsibility for execution between national and international institutions. Where alignment behind government-led strategies is not possible due to particularly weak governance or violent conflict, international actors should consult with a range of national stakeholders in the partner country, and seek opportunities for partial alignment at the sectoral or regional level. Where possible, international actors should seek to avoid activities which undermine national institution-building, such as developing parallel systems without thought to transition mechanisms and long term capacity development. It is important to identify functioning systems within existing local institutions, and work to strengthen these.
8. Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors. This can happen even in the absence of strong government leadership. Where possible, it is important to work together on: upstream analysis;
joint assessments; shared strategies; and co-ordination of political engagement. Practical initiatives can take the form of joint donor offices, an agreed division of labour among donors, delegated co-operation arrangements, multi-donor trust funds and common reporting and financial requirements. Wherever possible, international actors should work jointly with national reformers in government and civil society to develop a shared analysis of challenges and priorities.
In the case of countries in transition from conflict or international disengagement, the use of simple integrated planning tools, such as the transitional results matrix, can help set and monitor realistic priorities.
9. Act fast… but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance. Assistance to fragile states must be flexible enough to take advantage of windows of opportunity and respond to changing conditions on the ground. At the same time, given low capacity and the extent of the challenges facing fragile states, international engagement may need to be of longer-duration than in other low-income countries. Capacity development in core institutions will normally require an engagement of at least ten years. Since volatility of engagement (not only aid volumes, but also diplomatic engagement and field presence) is potentially destabilising for fragile states, international actors must improve aid predictability in these countries, and ensure mutual consultation and co-ordination prior to any significant changes to aid programming.
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion. International actors need to address the problem of “aid orphans” – states where there are no significant political barriers to engagement, but few international actors are engaged and aid volumes are low. This also applies to neglected geographical regions within a country, as well as neglected sectors and groups within societies. When international actors make resource allocation decisions about the partner countries and focus areas for their aid programs, they should seek to avoid unintentional exclusionary effects. In this respect, co-ordination of field presence, determination of aid flows in relation to absorptive capacity and mechanisms to respond to positive developments in these countries, are therefore essential. In some instances, delegated assistance strategies and leadership arrangements among donors may help to address the problem of aid orphans.
Annex B: Statistical data on international engagement in Haiti
Based on 2005 figures, the net disbursement of per capita ODA was USD 60. It averaged USD 41.7 in sub-Saharan Africa and USD 18.2 per capita in low-income countries. In overall volume, this represented 12.1% of GDP compared to an average for Africa of 5.1% and an average for low-income countries of 3.2% (Source: OECD).
Peace-keeping, official development assistance and emergency aid (Haiti, 2007) Chart 3.
Source: OECD (2010), annual Report on Resource Flows to Fragile States, OECD, Paris.
Table 5. Commitments and disbursements by sector of activity, 2007 (USD million)
Commitments Net disbursements
Security sector and its reform 4.7 2.7
Peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution 38.6 17.6
Post-conflict peace-building (United Nations) 1.9 1.9
Reintegration 0.1 0.1
Mine clearance -
-Child soldiers 0 0
Total A: “Conflict prevention and resolution,
peace and security” 45.3 22.3
Economy and development policy 26.8 23.5
Public sector management (public finances) 25.4 0.3
Legal and judicial development 7.7 10.7
Government and administration 11.9 7.3
Strengthening civil society 4.2 5.4
Elections 4.6 0.8
Human rights 1.7 1.4
Facilitating access to information 0.5 0.6
Equality of women 0.5 0.5
Monetary institutions -
-Total B “Government, civil society and monetary
institutions” (“Governance”) 83.3 50.5
Total A + B “PEACE AND GOvERNANCE” 670.9 546.5
Source: OECD (2007), OECD online database, OECD, Paris.
Peacekeeping
Total net ODA Humanitarian aid 500
600 700
400 300 200 100 0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Table 6. Peacekeeping expenditures compared to ODA, 2000-07 (USD million)
Peace-keeping as % of ODA
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2000-07 2000-07
Burundi - - - 40 304 239 118 . 701 29%
Ivory Coast - - - 83 337 382 450 471 1 723 53%
Dem. Rep. Congo 246 389 480 636 901 1 055 1 085 1 116 5 908 39%
Eritrea 164 185 210 184 180 156 126 113 1 318 59%
Haiti - - - 35 377 480 484 535 1 910 65%
Liberia - - - 548 741 707 676 688 3 360 196%
Lebanon 46 50 - - 56 - - - 152 4%
Sierra Leone 521 618 603 449 265 86 - - 2 541 79%
Sudan - - - - 219 801 990 846 2 856 33%
Timor-Leste 528 454 288 196 82 2 0 - 1 549 78%
Total 1 505 1 695 1 581 2 171 3 461 3 908 3 929 3 770 22 019 49%
Source: DAC-OECD (2008), Resource flows to fragile and conflict-affected states, OCDE, Paris. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/14/43293581.pdf.
Table 7. Foreign investment in Haiti and real annual variation as percentage
Source: Inter-American Development Bank: www.iadb.org/res/lmw_countrytables.cfm?country=Haiti.
Foreign investment
1997 2002 2006 2007 2008
Real annual variation, as % 7.65 2.55 2.18 2.77 1.54
% of GNP 24.5 25.1 28.9 27.7 25.7
Peacekeeping Expenditures Peacekeeping
Annex C: The co-ordination of technical and financial partners
Mechanisms for co-ordinating technical and financial partners (TFPs) are aligned to the mechanisms for co-ordinating national aid by the Ministry of Planning and External Co-operation, and are consistent with the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action.
1. Strategic co-ordination
In strategic terms, funding agencies in Haiti have two co-ordination platforms:
a. The Restricted Group
The Restricted Group of technical and financial partners is a political co-ordination group. Convened by the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General (SRSG), it includes representatives from diplomatic and multilateral missions to Haiti (the European Union, the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund).
There is also a broader group consisting of all cooperation partners present in Haiti. The group includes the G11 (see below), Germany, Switzerland, Mexico, Norway, the Organisation of American States (OAS), the organisation internationale de la francophonie (OIF), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Venezuela, Cuba and China.
b. The Executive Committee of Technical and Financial Partners (G11)
The Executive Committee of Technical and Financial Partners (G11) is co-ordinated by the United Nations Resident Co-ordinator and brings together the following 11 main TFPs in Haiti: the EU, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the IMF, the United Nations, Canada, Spain, France, the United States, Japan and a represen-tative (rotating every six months) of the ABC countries (Argentina, Brazil and Chile).
The G11 activities are structured into five main action lines as follows: monitoring of the DSNCRP; monitoring of governance indicators; sector co-ordination; implementation of the Paris Declaration; and communication.
Besides ensuring strategic co-ordination among the main partners, the G11 aims to promote the effectiveness of aid, a fully consistent joint strategy and a joint dialogue with the government. In strategic terms, the G11 constitutes the Advisory Committee of the funding agencies. The committee is appointed by the government to support monitoring of the DSNCRP.
Finally, four members of the G11 represent the TFPs in the Inter-ministerial Technical Sub-Committee for Co-ordination and the Sector Monitoring of Implementation (SCTICS) of the DSNCRP. The sub-committee is responsible for the (technical and operational) sector co-ordination of the execution and monitoring of the DSNCRP.
2. Operational and sector co-ordination
A system of 22 sector groups has been established to improve operational co-ordination between the TFPs and offer support to the government’s sector and geographical co-ordination (Chart 4).