Development-Oriented Alternatives to Debarment as an
Anticorruption Accountability Tool
F
RANKA. F
ARIELLOJ
R.
ANDG
IOVANNIB
OThe sanctions system is one of the World Bank’s primary tools for imposing accountability for fraud and corruption by private sector actors in connection with its operations.1 The system originated in 1996 in response to World Bank President James Wolfensohn’s determination to proceed forcefully against corruption in Bank-supported operations.2 The system was operationalized in 1998 as an internal administrative process, designed to assist the World Bank in upholding its fi duciary duty under the Articles of Agreement to ensure that the funds entrusted to it are used for the purposes intended, by providing a way for the Bank to exclude corrupt actors from Bank-fi nanced procurement—a step commonly referred to as “debarment.” More precisely, debarment is a declaration that a fi rm or individual is ineligible for the award of Bank-fi nanced contracts or further participation in the implementation of Bank-fi nanced operations.
The authors wish to thank Christopher R. Yukins, professor of government contract law and codirector of the Government Procurement Law Program, The George Washington University Law School; Yasutomo Morigiwa, professor of jurisprudence, Nagoya University Graduate School of Law; Tina Søreide, economist at the Faculty of Law, University of Bergen and Chr. Michelsen Institute; M. Rohil Hafeez, manager in the Integrity and AML/CTF unit of IFC’s Risk Management and Portfolio Vice Presidency; and Roman Majtan, procurement analyst in the World Bank’s General Services Department, who acted as peer reviewers for this chapter and provided us with invaluable insights. The views expressed in this chapter are, nevertheless, solely those of the authors, as are any remaining defects or inaccuracies.
1 An analysis of the broader World Bank Group sanctions system as it works at the Bank’s sister institutions, International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), is beyond the scope of this chapter; as of this writing, only the Bank has seen actual sanctions cases. Nevertheless, many of the same considerations apply to those institutions.
2 At the beginning of the Wolfensohn presidency, corruption was rarely mentioned in inter- national development circles as a major obstacle to development. One year into his tenure, Wolfensohn gave a groundbreaking “cancer of corruption” speech to the World Bank/In- ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) annual meeting, citing corruption as a “major barrier to sound and equitable development.” See James D. Wolfensohn, Annual Meetings Address (Oct.
1, 1996), h p://go.worldbank.org/PUC5BB8060. Since then, corruption has become widely recognized as a major obstacle to development that the Bank has tackled aggressively by supporting hundreds of anticorruption programs in its client countries and sanctioning more than 650 companies and individuals on grounds of fraud or corrupt activity. See World Bank Off . Suspension & Debarment, Report on Functions, Data, and Lessons Learned, 2007–2013 4 (World Bank 2014), h p://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOFFEVASUS/Resources/OSD Report.pdf.
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Since 1998, the system has evolved toward a quasi-judicial model, with increasing transparency and due process protections, while retaining its administrative nature. As a result of reforms approved by the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors in 2004 and 2006,3 the sanctions system now consists of a two-tier adjudicative process, with a fi rst level of review carried out by a Bank offi cer and, in contested cases, a second level of review by the World Bank Group Sanctions Board, an independent body composed of three Bank staff and four non-Bank staff members who consider the case de novo and make a fi nal, nonappealable decision.
The reforms in 2006 added a range of additional possible sanctions:
debarment with conditional release, conditional non-debarment,4 le ers of reprimand,5 and restitution.6 In 2010, the “baseline,” or default, sanction was changed to debarment with conditional release. Yet a recent review of the sanctions system found that debarment (with or without conditions for release) remains far and away the most commonly imposed sanction, account- ing for 93 percent of all sanctions imposed by the system.7
3 The Bank’s sanctions procedures are based on recommendations made by Dick Thorn- burgh in his Report concerning the Debarment Processes of the World Bank (hereinafter Thorn- burgh Report). See Dick Thornburgh et al., Report concerning the Debarment Processes of the World Bank 5–6 (World Bank 2002), h p://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROCUREMENT /Resources/thornburghreport.pdf.
4 A party that is sanctioned with conditional non-debarment remains eligible to be awarded Bank-fi nanced contracts provided that compliance with certain defi ned conditions within a set time frame is met. However, failure to comply with the conditions for release results in the party’s debarment for a defi ned period of time. Compliance is determined by the World Bank integrity compliance offi cer (ICO) and is subject to the same procedure as for condi- tions for release from debarment. Conditional non-debarment is normally applied in cases where the respondent has already taken comprehensive voluntary corrective measures, and the circumstances otherwise indicate that the respondent need not be debarred. Conditional non-debarment may also be applied to parents and other affi liates of respondents in cases where they were not engaged in misconduct but when a systemic failure to supervise made the misconduct possible. See World Bank, Sanctioning Guidelines (Jan. 1, 2011), h p://
go.worldbank.org/CVUUIS7HZ0 (hereinafter, Sanctioning Guidelines).
5 Le ers of reprimand are generally imposed when debarment and conditional non-debar- ment are disproportionate to the off ense. In such cases, the Bank issues a le er of reprimand to the sanctioned party. Examples include cases where an affi liate of the respondent has been found to share responsibility for the misconduct because of an isolated lapse in supervision, but the affi liate was not in any way complicit in the misconduct. See id.
6 Restitution, as well as fi nancial and other remedies, may be used in exceptional circumstanc- es, including those involving fraud in contract execution where there is a quantifi able amount to be restored to the client country or project. See Sanctioning Guidelines, supra note 4.
7 Of the 177 sanctions imposed through fi scal year (FY) 2012, only 5 deviated from the base- line sanction of either fi xed-term or debarment with conditional release: three conditional non-debarments (one of which was accompanied by a le er of reprimand) and two le ers of reprimand; all of these were imposed in the context of a negotiated resolution of the case (also referred to as a se lement). Similarly, restitution has been imposed only fi ve times; four times in the context of se lements and by the Sanctions Board in one case. See infra note 41 and Review of the World Bank Group Sanctions Regime, 2011–2014, Phase I Review: Stock-Taking, Initi- ating Discussion Brief, h p://consultations.worldbank.org/consultation/sanctions-reviews.
Recently, the Bank has begun to refl ect on the underlying objectives that it has set for the sanctions system. Although the traditional legal basis for sanc- tions lies in the fi duciary duty to protect the proper use of Bank fi nancing, one can argue that the fi duciary duty is itself merely a means to an end—and that end is the Bank’s development mandate as set out in its Articles of Agree- ment. Indeed, the articles provide that “the Bank shall be guided in all its deci- sions” by its mandate8—and, although it is rarely pointed out, those decisions include sanctions decisions. As this chapter discusses, a sanctions system that is expressly aimed at supporting the Bank’s development mandate could look quite diff erent than the system that exists today.9
Debarment: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
For the World Bank, debarment has served a vital function in upholding the Bank’s fi duciary duty by excluding corrupt actors from Bank fi nancing. Other international fi nancial institutions, including the other major multilateral development banks, have analogous sanctions systems aimed at tackling fraud and corruption in the operations they fi nance.10 National administrative sys- tems, including the United States11 and the European Union12 and a growing
8 See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) Articles of Agreement, art. I, and International Development Association (IDA) Articles of Agreement, art. I.
9 Sanctions also serve a de facto purpose, not expressly stated in sanctions policy, of protect- ing the Bank’s reputation from harm by association with corrupt actors. Although some commentators consider avoidance of reputational risk to be an illegitimate objective for a public institution, we disagree. See Hans-Joachim Priess, Questionable Assumptions: The Case for Updating the Suspension and Debarment Regimes at the Multilateral Development Banks, 45 Geo. Wash. Intl. L. Rev. 271, 278 (2013) (arguing that reputation “cannot be regarded as a valid aim for a sanctions and debarment regime because it is in confl ict with the application of the strict rule of law”). An international organization like the World Bank depends on the goodwill and consequent fi nancial support of its membership, without which it could not pursue its development mandate.
10 In addition to the World Bank, all other major multilateral development banks (MDBs), namely, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Inter-Ameri- can Development Bank (IDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the African Develop- ment Bank (AfDB), have adopted internal mechanisms for addressing and sanctioning viola- tions of their respective anticorruption policies. In September 2006, the MDBs, together with the European Investment Bank Group and the IMF, established a Joint International Institu- tion Anti-Corruption Task Force and agreed on four prohibited practices: corruption, fraud, coercion, and collusion. See International Financial Institutions: Anti-Corruption Task Force, Uniform Framework for Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption 1 (2006), h p://sitere sources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/FinallFITaskForceFramework&Gdlines.pdf. See also Stephen S. Zimmermann & Frank A. Fariello, Jr., Coordinating the Fight against Corrup- tion: Agreement on Cross Debarment among Multilateral Development Banks, in The World Bank Legal Review, vol. 3, 189 (World Bank 2012).
11 See Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 48 C.F.R. subpart 9.4 (2005) (containing the regula- tions that control how federal agencies can administratively suspend or debar).
12 The EU procurement regime is primarily governed by Directive 2004/17/EC (the “Utilities Directive”) and Directive 2004/18/EC (the “Public Sector Directive”), which institute man- datory obligations to exclude possible contracting parties for past convictions of specifi ed corruption off enses and the option of states excluding parties not meeting certain other cri- teria that involve the trustworthiness and reliability of the economic operators. See Directive
number of developing countries, including India,13 Colombia,14 Nigeria,15 and Tanzania,16 to name a few, have adopted debarment as an anticorruption tool in public procurement.
The original vision for the Bank’s sanction system was ambitious indeed.
Thornburgh sets out his vision for the system thusly: “With regard to eff ec- tiveness, we believe that the goal should be to employ procedures that would have the promise of ensuring detection and debarment of virtually all fi rms that in fact have engaged in fraudulent or corrupt activities.”17
It has become clear over time that the system has not been able to achieve Thornburgh’s vision as a comprehensive mechanism for excluding bad actors from Bank-fi nanced operations. The Bank imposes roughly 40 to 50 sanctions per year; it fi nances about 20,000 to 30,000 contracts per year. Although, one hopes, only a small percentage of those contracts are tainted by corruption,18 the system would need to take a quantum leap in reach to fulfi ll its original exclusionary ambitions.
In addition to the direct protective impact of excluding corrupt actors from Bank-fi nanced operations, the sanctions system is intended to serve as
2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Offi cial Journal of the European Union: Legislation (O.J. L) 134, 30.4.2004, p. 1, and Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Par- liament and of the Council, O.J. L 134, 30.4.2004, p. 114, art. 45(1). In December 2011, the Eu- ropean Commission proposed a revision as well as the adoption of a directive on concession contracts. Under the new rules, the grounds for exclusion are extended to include undue in- fl uence in the decision-making process leading to the award of a contract, false statements in connection with the procedure for the award of a public contract, and agreements to distort competition. See Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of Feb.
26, 2014, on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, O.J. L 94, 28.03.2014, p.
65; Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of Feb. 26, 2014, on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport, and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC, O.J. L 94, 28.03.2014, p. 450; and Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of Feb. 26, 2014, on the award of concession contracts, O.J. L 94, 28.03.2014, p. 1.
13 Sandeep Verma, Debarment and Suspension in Public Procurement: A Quick Survey of Associated Government Regulations and Practice in India (Dec. 5, 2012), h p://ssrn.com/abstract=2185219.
14 Estatuto anticorrupció n por la cual se dictan normas orientadas a fortalecer los mecanismos de pre- venció n, investigació n y sanció n de actos de corrupció n y la efectividad del control de la gestió n pú blica, h p://www.contraloriagen.gov.co/documents/10136/49245504/cartilla-estatuto-anti corrupcion.pdf/.
15 See Nigeria Pub. Procurement Act of 2007, part II, sec. 6.
16 See Tanzania Pub. Procurement Act No. 21 of 2004, sec. 57, which mandates the Public Pro- curement Regulatory Authority to debar a supplier, contractor, or consultant who has been declared ineligible by a foreign country, international organization, or other foreign institu- tions from participating in public procurement.
17 Thornburgh Report, supra note 3, at 8.
18 However, a 2007 report of the Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative estimates that corrupt money associated with bribes received by public offi cials from developing and transition countries is US$20 billion to $40 billion per year—a fi gure equivalent to 20 to 40 percent of fl ows of offi cial development assistance. United Nations Offi ce on Drug and Crime and the World Bank, Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative: Challenges, Opportunities, and Action Plan 1 (World Bank 2007).
a disincentive against corrupt behavior, that is, in legal terms, to act as both a specifi c deterrent for the sanctioned party and a general deterrent for oth- ers who participate in Bank-supported operations.19 More broadly, the system aspires to contribute, however modestly, to the global fi ght against corruption through direct means but also through cross-debarment and referral of the Bank’s investigative fi ndings with national authorities.20
The notion that debarment provides a deterrent is widely accepted in the legal literature.21 In theory, a rational actor who is prone to corrupt behav- ior will refrain from that behavior if its “cost” in likely penalties exceeds its likely benefi ts.22 Of course, this seemingly commonsense calculation hinges on an unknowable—the likelihood of ge ing caught or, more to the point, the actor’s perception of that likelihood. Moreover, the “cost” of engaging in corruption includes subjective factors such as the moral cost in the mind of the actor, which in turns depends on a complex set of social, cultural, and psychological factors.
19 See Thornburgh Report, supra note 3, at 60 (stating that “[c]ompliance is achieved, in broad terms, through incapacitation in the form of debarment, and through deterrence in the form of publicizing the risk of future debarment”). Compare Priess, supra note 9, at 280 (arguing that these aspects of the current sanctions and debarment systems, which Priess views as punitive, should be eliminated).
20 In April 2010, the heads of fi ve leading MDBs—the AfDB, the ADB, the EBRD, the IDB, and the World Bank Group—signed the Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Deci- sions. See Intl. Fin. Institutions Anti-Corruption Task Force, Uniform Framework for Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption (Sept. 2006). See, generally, Stephen S. Zimmermann &
Frank A. Fariello, Jr., Coordinating the Fight against Fraud and Corruption: Agreement on Cross- Debarment among Multilateral Development Banks, in International Financial Institutions and Global Legal Governance (World Bank 2011).
21 Debarment in national systems is generally not meant to be a punishment for misconduct.
Rather, debarment is the consequence that the law a aches to the government’s lack of trust in a given player. In the US context, see FAR, Section 9.402 (b). See also Jessica Tillipman, A House of Cards Falls: Why “Too Big to Debar” Is All Slogan and Li le Substance, Res Gestae Paper 7 (2012) (arguing that debarment as a “nuclear sanction” should not be utilized sim- ply because it is politically popular), h p://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/res_gestae/7. In economic terms, however, debarment is a cost in a fi rm’s cost-benefi t analysis. See James C. Nobles, Jr., & Christina Maistrellis, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Systematic Solution for the U.S.
Multinational, L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 5, 11 (Spring 1995) (submi ing that “[f]or large defense contractors, disbarment from U.S. government contracts could well be the most signifi cant deterrent to engaging in conduct proscribed under the FCPA”); Drury D. Stevenson & Nich- olas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to Debar?, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 775, 803 (2011) (ar- guing that FCPA fi nes have li le if any deterrent eff ect when the benefi ts derived from the sanctionable conduct largely outweigh the cost of ge ing caught). See also J. Kelly Strader, White Collar Crime and Punishment: Refl ections on Michael, Martha, and Milberg Weiss, 15 Geo.
Mason L. Rev. 45, 102 (2007) (“There is substantial evidence that white collar defendants are strongly deterred by civil/administrative sanctions, including debarment). For a discussion of the various objectives of procurement systems, see, generally, Steven Schooner, Desiderata:
Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law, 11 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 103 (2002).
22 See, for example, John Coff ee, No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386, 389 (1981) (quoting Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 [1968] and R. Posner, Eco- nomic Analysis of Law 165–67 [Aspen 1977]).
Another problem with the debarment-deterrence equation is that debar- ments have an unpredictable economic impact on the debarred party.
Debarment periods are calculated against a baseline that is common to all sanctionable practices, adjusted for aggravating and mitigating factors relat- ing to the respondent’s culpability or responsibility, not on the debarment’s impact on the respondent or others. So if a debarred party does a great deal of Bank Group or multilateral development bank (MDB)–fi nanced business, it may suff er severe loss of business or even corporate death as a consequence of debarment. On the other hand, a debarred party that does li le Bank Group business may suff er very li le direct loss of business from the debarment.23 So the same debarment may impose wildly diff erent economic costs on the debarred party, and therefore create diff erent degrees of specifi c deterrence;
such disparate impact also raises questions of fairness and proportionality.
To the authors’ knowledge, there have been no empirical studies that prove or disprove the widely held belief that debarments and other such pen- alties have a strong deterrent eff ect.24 Some research suggests that the severity of the penalty is less important to deterrence than the mere fact that there is a credible reaction, coupled with the legal costs of defending oneself against the charge and the reputational cost of the penalty.25 In the Bank context, this la er view suggests that all Bank sanctions, not just debarment, could provide a degree of deterrence. Indeed, private sector stakeholders often say that they fear the cost in reputation and goodwill occasioned by the public nature of sanctions more than the sanction itself.26 Moreover, because Bank sanctions are part of a larger enforcement architecture, including the sanctions systems of other MDBs and national enforcement measures, Bank sanctions need not, in and of themselves, provide perfect deterrence.
Although the deterrent eff ect of debarment remains unclear, we do know that debarment can come at a signifi cant cost to the Bank and its borrowers
23 Indirect loss of business may ensue from loss of reputation and the fact that Bank sanctions are being used, by an increasing number of external parties, for due diligence purposes.
24 On the issue of corporate punishment, research has primarily focused on the doctrine of corporate criminal liability, with some scholars submi ing that harsh corporate penalties provide deterrence on a massive scale. See, for example, Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1141 (1982–83) (arguing that the nature of deterrence and retribution as applied to corporations implies the need for criminal as well as civil liability); and Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Cor- porate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1095, 1097 (2006). In contrast, other commentators believe that harsh penalties might distort fi rms’ incentives to monitor for misconduct and undermine the de- terrence of professional fi rms’ members. See, for example, Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 271–310 (2008) (also calling for greater reli- ance on purely fi nancial corporate penalties).
25 See, for example, Erling Eide, Paul H. Rubin, & Joanna M. Shepard, Economics of Crime, in Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics 205–79 (Now Publg. 2006); and Alon Harel, Eco- nomic Analysis of Criminal Law: A Survey, in Research Handbook on the Economics of Criminal Law (Edward Elgar 2012).
26 Anne-Marie Leroy & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions Process and Its Recent Reforms, 74–75 (World Bank 2012).
in the delivery of development results. A debarred company is excluded from Bank-fi nanced public procurement, which, in markets where willing qualifi ed bidders are few and far between, can have an anticompetitive eff ect and impede the delivery of development results, at least in the immediate term.27 In such cases, debarments may (or may not) fulfi ll the system’s fi duciary objective, but they arguably come into confl ict with the broader objective of promoting the Bank’s development mandate. The problem is particularly acute because debarments are applied in a way that is arguably overbroad in cases where the system’s putative fi duciary objectives may not be served. The sanctions system operates on a respondeat superior basis,28 which is to say that a corrupt act by any agent or employee is a ributed to the principal, whether or not it can be shown that the legal entity as a whole poses a fi duciary risk to Bank operations.
Debarment may have other possible negative side eff ects, although these remain to be studied empirically. By reducing the number of market actors, for example, depending on the conditions of a given market, including the num- ber of competing actors, debarment may have the eff ect of facilitating collusive practices among the remaining market actors, at least in smaller markets.
One problem with the system’s wider aspiration to reduce overall levels of corruption through deterrence is that corruption, broadly defi ned, is not subject to consistent legal standards; enforcement is similarly uneven. Similar to what has been recently argued in regard to enforcement of the Foreign Cor- rupt Practices Act (FCPA),29 because of this uneven playing fi eld, debarments
27 See, for example, Danielle Brian, Contractor Debarment and Suspension: A Broken System, 13 Pub. Procurement L. Rev. 235, 236–38 (2004) (calling for contract unbundling as a way to favor competition); John S. Pachter, The New Era of Corporate Governance and Ethics: The Ex- treme Sport of Government Contracting, 13 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. 247 (2004) (suggesting that “the suspension and debarment arena has become a virtual bid protest forum for companies seeking to eliminate competition”); and Johann Graf Lambsdorff , Deterrence and Constrained Enforcement: Alternative Regimes to Deal with Bribery, Passauer Diskussionspapiere: Volk- swirtschaftliche Reihe, No. V-60-10 (2010), h p://hdl.handle.net/10419/55014 (stating that debarment is a less eff ective sanction than fi nes because the costs of debarment, like those of imprisonment, are higher than those of fi nes, in that debarment hurts both the company and the public by limiting competition). See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 21, at 816 (arguing that debarment reduces competition for future bidding on new projects).
The Thornburgh Report recognized the importance of protecting respondents against inac- curate or unjust determinations because of the Bank’s “special economic interest and respon- sibility” and because of the adverse signifi cant impact of debarments on both contractors and the Bank. In fact, debarment not only cuts contractors off from a major source of funding that is available in the country but can adversely aff ect future competitions and the Bank’s ability to obtain needed goods or services because the number of qualifi ed contractors may be limited. Hence, in excluding a fi rm from future business, the Bank “may be eliminating from future contention one of the very few fi rms with the characteristics required by the Bank for important projects.” Thornburgh Report, supra note 3, at 7.
28 See, for example, Sanctions Board Decisions, nos. 36, 37, 39, and 44, as cited in the World Bank Group Sanctions Board Law Digest (Dec. 2011), at 37 et seq. The Sanctions Board has recog- nized a possible “‘rogue employee”’ defense but, to the authors’ knowledge, that defense has never been successfully asserted. See Sanctions Board Decision no. 39.
29 Andrew B. Spalding, Restorative Justice for Multinational Corporations (2014), h p://papers .ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2403930; see also Andrew B. Spalding, Unwit-
and other deterrence-based enforcement approaches may simply drive some of the Bank’s client countries (and the private sector) toward projects fi nanced by donors with fewer legal constraints (so-called black knights). With less scrupulous actors on both the demand and the supply sides of the equation, this uneven enforcement picture could paradoxically result in an increase in corruption levels in certain countries. This dilemma should be addressed through be er and more harmonized enforcement, but that is a long-term goal.
Beyond the issue of whether debarments provide deterrence, or more deterrence than other sanctions, the authors would argue that Bank sanctions need not always be designed to deter. Given how few sanctions the Bank imposes relative to the volume of the operations it fi nances, sanctions need to have a demonstration eff ect with general impact beyond the particular case or respondent. But that demonstration eff ect need not always come in the form of a negative incentive like debarment; it could provide a positive incentive, for example, for self-cleaning or other comprehensive corrective actions, includ- ing—as this chapter discusses—remedial actions that mitigate the harm occa- sioned by the corrupt act. This approach to sanctions might not only avoid the negative consequences for development eff ectiveness that debarment can sometimes infl ict but could also be designed in a way that actively contributes to the Bank’s development mandate.
Notwithstanding the collateral consequences and other drawbacks of debarment, the authors do not intend to argue that debarment should be done away with. For one thing, its immediate purpose—the exclusion of bad actors—remains vital. Even if the system cannot hope to catch and exclude all bad actors from Bank fi nancing operations, that is not a reason not to exclude those that it does manage to catch. Debarment also plays an indispensable role as a “backup” sanction; given that the Bank is a non sovereign, debar- ment remains the only eff ective tool for the enforcement of alternative forms of sanction such as restitution. And although robust empirical evidence for the deterrence value of debarment appears to be lacking, one may reasonably infer that debarment does deter corrupt behavior; it should do so in principle, and, as the aphorism goes, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
The collateral consequences of debarment vary widely, depending on the markets impacted, the nature of the debarred party, and the length of the debarment period. If a debarred fi rm as an enterprise (rather than a few indi- viduals within a fi rm) constitutes a corrupt actor, it can be persuasively argued that its presence distorts the market and, on balance, it is be er to remove that actor even if its removal reduces competition. While debarments may have short-term negative consequences, they may well, in the longer term,
ting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-bribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions against Emerging Markets, 62 Fla. L. Rev. 351, 355–56 (2010) (arguing that companies subject to antibribery legislation are investing less in countries where bribery is perceived to be more prevalent).
help clean markets dominated by corrupt actors (who may, through collusive behavior, freeze out other actors) and improve competitive conditions.30
The authors would posit, however, that the ambiguities surrounding debarment suggest that a more proportionate and nuanced approach to sanc- tions is not only possible but desirable, and the sanctions system’s current, almost exclusive, reliance on debarment as the sanction of choice deserves reconsideration.
Alternatives to Debarment
Against this background, the time may be ripe for study and refl ection on pos- sible alternative approaches to debarment. Debarment, whether for a defi ned or indefi nite period, with or without conditional release, is not the exclusive reaction available to the Bank when faced with corrupt behavior by a private sector actor. The Bank may also impose conditional non-debarment (usually involving an integrity compliance program), restitution or fi nancial remedy, and le ers of reprimand, with the last being a “slap on the wrist” reserved for responsibility cases and very minor forms of misconduct (principally in the se lement context). Outside the sanctions system stricto sensu, the Bank main- tains a Voluntary Disclosure Program (VDP) that allows participants to avoid debarment or other sanctions entirely; it also refers most cases of corruption to appropriate national authorities.31 Unfortunately, up to now, none of these alternatives has lived up to its full potential, leaving debarment in a dominant position in the system.
Integrity Compliance Programs
Integrity compliance was introduced into the Bank sanctions system as part of the 2009–10 round of reforms; these reforms were defi nitively incorporated into the sanctions process through the issuance of new sanctions procedures and related internal guidance in January 2011.32 The reform was intended, fi rst and foremost, to address the risk of recidivism by debarred parties by impos- ing integrity compliance as a condition for release. Integrity compliance is
30 But see Tina Søreide, Drivers of Corruption: A Brief Review (World Bank forthcoming), where she argues that selective leniency is a be er strategy for disrupting cartel behavior.
31 Although the sanctions system targets the so-called supply side of corruption, the Bank has the discretion to exercise contractual remedies to address the demand side of corruption.
See IBRD General Conditions for Loans, secs. 7.02(c) and 7.03(c) (2012) (providing that the Bank may suspend and terminate in whole or in part the right of the borrower to make withdrawals from the loan account if it determines that any representative of the borrower has engaged in a sanctionable practice in connection with the use of loan proceeds, without the borrower having taken timely and appropriate action satisfactory to the Bank to address such practices when they occur). Additionally, the World Bank regularly refers its investi- gative fi ndings to national governments and law enforcement agencies in member coun- tries. See Integrity Vice Presidency (INT), Annual Reports [hereinafter INT Annual Reports], h p://go.worldbank.org/T40HHT3RF0.
32 See Leroy & Fariello, supra note 26.
also a feature of conditional non-debarment, under which a sanctioned party may avoid debarment altogether if it adopts and implements a robust integ- rity compliance program. This secondary function, which could be an alterna- tive to the current heavy reliance on debarment, has been used in only fi ve reported cases, all but one in the context of se lements.33
So far, the Bank’s Integrity Compliance Offi cer (ICO), a position that was established to determine whether a debarred party has met the conditions for release from debarment or non-debarment, has seen limited engagement by respondents, in particular small and medium-size entities (SMEs), raising the prospect that, contrary to intentions, debarment with conditional release will become, de facto, a road to indefi nite debarment.34
The reasons for this lack of engagement are various, but one possible explanation is the potentially heavy cost that integrity compliance places on sanctioned parties. For some fi rms, this cost may outweigh the benefi ts of Bank-related business. Walmart, for example, has spent US$109 million in the past two years to enhance its global compliance program.35 Walmart, of course, is a giant multinational corporate group, but even for moderately sized multi- national fi rms, the average cost of a compliance program has been estimated at US$3.5 million.36 Although compliance programs are widely believed to bring important benefi ts to fi rms in preventing future corruption, like debarment, robust empirical evidence for this belief is largely lacking.37 By contrast, it is
33 As of FY 2013, the only case of conditional non-debarment outside the se lement context was sanctions case no. 112, decided by the Sanctions Board in decision no. 53. See supra note 7.
34 For a discussion of the pa ern of nonengagement of small and medium-size enterprises in the sanctions system, see Giovanni Bo & Frank Fariello, The World Bank Group Sanctions System and Access to Justice for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises; and Bart Stevens & Robert Delonis, Leveling the Playing Field: A Race to the Top, in Fostering Development through Oppor- tunity, Inclusion, and Equity, both in The World Bank Legal Review vol. 5 (World Bank 2014), which also describes the steps that the Bank is taking to ameliorate these issues.
35 Walmart, 2014 Annual Report, 56, h p://cdn.corporate.walmart.com/66/e5/9ff 9a87445949173f de56316ac5f/2014-annual-report.pdf.
36 In this study, the average cost of a compliance program includes the full cost of an orga- nization’s compliance eff orts, including the cost of noncompliance with laws, regulations, and policies. See The True Cost of Compliance: A Benchmark Study of Multinational Organiza- tions (Ponemon Inst. 2011), h p://www.tripwire.com/tripwire/assets/File/ponemon/True _Cost_of_Compliance_Report.pdf (estimating that the average cost of compliance among the organizations in the study was US$3.5 million compared with the nearly US$9.4 million for organizations that experience noncompliance-related problems).
37 See, for example, Nicole Sandford & Donna Epps, Compliance Program: On Everyone’s Agenda, 29(6) Financial Executive 59 (July 2013); Katharina Wulf, Ethics and Compliance Programs in Multinational Organizations 403 (Springer Gabler 2012); and Dove Izraeli & Mark Schwar , What Can We Learn from the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Ethics?, 17 J.
Bus. Ethics 1045 (1998) (referring to a 1994 survey of the Ethics Resource Center, indicating that ethics programs appear to improve ethical behavior, and to a study by the Council of Ethical Organizations fi nding that “[e]mployees of companies that had implemented or for- tifi ed comprehensive ethics compliance programs in response to the guidelines . . . reported that they were less likely to violate laws and policies”). This notwithstanding, one of the major challenges with measuring compliance program eff ectiveness lies in the interpretation of the data obtained from the multiplicity of indicators and metrics that may be used (e.g., compli-
not uncommon for large multinational corporations that have robust compli- ance programs in place to face corruption scandals by corporate offi cers.38 Financial Restitution and Other Remedies
The Bank’s sanctions system also embraces restitution and other fi nancial remedies as a possible sanction. The term “restitution” is an ambiguous one, with legal sources and scholars often using the word in ways that confl ate at least three distinguishable concepts:
• True restitution, or what is known in U.S. law as the disgorgement of illicit profi ts. True restitution is based on the idea that a person(s) who engages in misconduct such as corruption to make a profi t (the “wrongdoer”) has been unjustly enriched. Justice demands that a wrongdoer not be allowed to gain from his or her misconduct and therefore must give up those illicit profi ts.
• Damages or compensation. This can be seen as the fl ip side of the true res- titution coin, with a focus on the person(s) who were harmed by the misconduct (i.e., the “victim”) rather than the wrongdoer.39 The victim is made whole by the wrongdoer with payment or action adequate to undo harm he or she has suff ered. “Damages” is the term used in national tort and contract law; “compensation” is the term generally used in international law.
• Fines. Although often lumped together as part of restitution, fi nes in most legal systems are not considered restitution at all, but rather a form of punish-
ance audit results, incidents, training data, risk assessment results, hotline data, and employee disclosures). See Jaclyn Jaeger, Measuring Compliance Program Eff ectiveness, Compliance Week (July 19, 2011), h p://www.complianceweek.com/news/news-bulletin/measuring-compliance -program-eff ectiveness (also arguing that the answers as to whether compliance programs are eff ective “are still elusive”); Jaclyn Jaeger, The Metrics System: Measuring Compliance Eff ectiveness, Compliance Week (June 12, 2012), h p://www.complianceweek.com/news/news-bulletin/the -metrics-system-measuring-compliance-eff ectiveness; Steve Koslow, Why Measuring Compliance Eff ectiveness Is So Diffi cult, Compliance Week (May 1, 2012), h p://www.complianceweek.com /news/news-bulletin/why-measuring-compliance-eff ectiveness-is-so-diffi cult.
38 See Roberta Holland, Bribery Probe Ends with Charges against Former GSK China Top Executive, Compliance Week (May 21, 2014), h p://www.complianceweek.com/bribery-probe-ends -with-charges-against-former-gsk-china-top-executive/article/347876/ (reporting that the investigation into pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline’s operations in China resulted in bribery charges against the former head of GSK China and prompted GSK to conduct a “rigorous review” of its compliance procedures in China); Michael Scher, Walmart: It’s Not the Company, It’s the Compliance System, The FCPA Blog (May 13, 2014), h p://www .fcpablog.com/blog/2014/5/13/walmart-its-not-the-company-its-the-compliance-system.html
#sthash.sCu4NPTj.dpuf (reporting that the compliance program that Walmart had in place at the time of the alleged misconduct of certain executives was “good for its time”).
39 See Directive 2014/24/EU, supra note 12, art. 57 (listing payment of compensation in respect of any damage caused by the criminal off ense or misconduct as one of the elements evi- dencing the fi rm’s reliability); and U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, Guidelines Manual, ch. 8, sec.
B1.1, Restitution—Organizations (Nov. 1, 2013) (stating the general principle requiring an organization to take all appropriate steps to provide compensation to victims and otherwise remedy the harm caused or threatened).
ment that is unrelated to restoring the status quo ante of the parties involved in the wrongdoing, but related rather to the harm to the public good.40 The legislative history of the Bank’s sanctions process indicates support, at one time or another, for all three forms of restitution, particularly the fi rst two.
However, restitution has been used sparingly—in only fi ve reported cases.41 The reasons for this relative nonuse of restitution, whether under a true restitu- tion or damages concept, has to do with the inherent diffi culties of calculating the quantum to be restituted and identifi cation of the appropriate benefi ciary.
In cases of true restitution under national law, the amount to be paid in restitution equals the amount that the court (or other decision maker) deter- mines to be the value of the illicit gain to the wrongdoer, as measured, for example, by the amount of a tainted contract (plus any ancillary quantifi able benefi ts to the respondent arising from the misconduct) less the contractor’s costs. In practice, calculating these amounts with precision can be extremely challenging, in particular, outside the se lements context.
In cases involving damages under national law, the amount to be paid is equal to the damage done to those harmed by the misconduct. The main issue in determining the quantum of damages tends to be the extent to which
“indirect” harm can be a ributed to the wrongdoing, with the usual test being articulated as “proximate cause”—that is, whether it was reasonably foresee- able that the wrongful act would cause the harm. In a typical case involving a tainted contract in the Bank context, a minimum measure of damages could be calculated as the contract value less the reasonable value of any goods, works, or services received by the victim.42 In many cases, the secondary eff ects of the poor or subpar performance of the contract would clearly be a legitimate fac- tor—but calculating and proving these secondary eff ects is very challenging.43 In theory, fi nes could provide a way out of these diffi culties of calcula- tion. Typically, no a empt is made to peg the amount to a restoration of the status quo ante, with respect to the respondent or the victim. Instead, the quantum of a fi ne is a notional amount determined by what is needed to act as an eff ective deterrence against future wrongdoing and is usually gradu- ated according to the seriousness of the wrongdoing. The idea of imposing fi nes for sanctionable practices has, from time to time, been fl oated within the
40 See, generally, Graham Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution (Oxford U. Press 2006).
41 See Integrity Vice Presidency, Press Release 2011/279/INT (re C. Lo i & Associati Societa’
di Ingegneria S.p.A.); Press Release 2013/003/INT (re Oxford U. Press East Africa Ltd. and Oxford U. Press Tanzania Ltd.); Press Release 2009/168/EXC (re Limited Liability Company Siemens); Press Release 2012/282/INT (re Alstom Hydro France and Alstom Network Sch- weiz AG) and Sanctions Board Decision no. 53.
42 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Hansen thus provided additional guid- ance on the computation of damages (although, confusingly, it referred in this case to “resti- tution” instead of “damages”).
43 Various ways have been devised under national and international systems to get around these diffi culties.
Bank—indeed, the idea goes back to Thornburgh44—but the Bank has never formally embraced fi nes.45 Among other things, doubts have been expressed about the Bank’s legal authority to levy fi nes, given that it is not a sovereign power, although, arguably, payment of a notional amount as a condition for release from debarment or non-debarment could circumvent this objection.
More fundamental are the objections that fi nes would create the perception, if not the reality, that corrupt actors could view fi nes as simply another cost of doing business, allowing them to pay their way out of trouble.46 Fines would tend to favor larger fi rms with deep pockets over SMEs. Fines also would tend to contradict the Bank’s traditional assertion that its sanctions system is not meant to be punitive but protective in nature.47
Besides diffi culties of calculation, restitution has posed challenges for the Bank in identifying the suitable benefi ciary of restituted funds. Tradition- ally, at least under a damages concept of restitution, funds are returned to the party harmed. In cases where the victims of the wrongdoing are clearly iden- tifi able, there is a strong argument that fi nancial penalties should be passed on or otherwise used for the benefi t of those persons. But in the context of Bank sanctions, the harm done to development eff ectiveness through corruption in connection with a Bank-fi nanced operation may be widespread, and identifi - cation of a specifi c victim or victims practically impossible.
More recently, the Bank has taken the view that the proceeds of restitution belong to the government concerned, as the most direct victim of corruption.
This was the Bank’s commitment in its 2010 se lement with Lo i Ingenieria S.p.A., where the Bank imposed the restitution of US$350,000 to the govern- ment of Indonesia for unjustifi ed payments received by Lo i and its partners as a result of fraudulent invoicing.48 But this approach raises its own concerns.
In some cases, government offi cials have been complicit in the sanctionable practice at some level, so returning money to the implicated government agency may not always seem to be the most prudent course of action.
The current guidance in the Sanctioning Guidelines recognizes these diffi culties when it provides that fi nancial remedies should be used only in
44 See Thornburgh Report, supra note 3, at 59–60.
45 One exception was the US$100 million Siemens Integrity Initiative (SII), which was created as part of the 2009 se lement agreement between the Bank and the Siemens Group. The US$100 million fi gure was deemed a kind of restitution, but the payment was not calculated based on an estimate of illicit profi ts or damage done, nor was there any requirement that the SII be directed to the “victims” of Siemens’ wrongdoing. See World Bank, Press Release 2009/001/EXT.
46 See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 21, at 795–96.
47 Notwithstanding this assertion, even without fi nes, some stakeholders see the sanctions sys- tem as punitive in nature.
48 In one case, notwithstanding the respondent’s intent to comply with its obligation, restitu- tion has not been paid yet because of the inability to determine which government agency is entitled to receive the funds.
reported cases where restitution has been imposed as a sanction came in the context of a negotiated resolution of the case. Se lement negotiations allow for an exchange between the Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) and the respondent to sort out the relevant facts and, in appropriate cases, identify and agree on reasonable proxies where precise facts are lacking. By contrast, in the absence of clear criteria by which to assess the funds to be restituted or, in most cases, clear evidence on which to base such an assessment, the Suspension and Debarment Offi cer (SDO) and the Sanctions Board have been quite under- standably reluctant (or perhaps simply unable) to move into this delicate area.
However, there has been one case to date where restitution was imposed by the Sanctions Board as a condition for non-debarment of the respondent based on the suffi ciency of the evidence produced by INT on charges of overbilling.50 Letters of Reprimand
The Sanctions Commi ee, which predated the Sanctions Board, imposed le ers of reprimand on a fairly regular basis. It did so when a sanctionable practice was deemed minor enough for this proverbial slap on the wrist or, interestingly, in cases where the commi ee did not fi nd that the respondent’s conduct amounted to a sanctionable practice but evidenced an ethical failure that merited some censure.51 Under the current system, le ers of reprimand have been used only occasionally in the context of se lements.52 Le ers of rep- rimand could be used more frequently, and their customary use as censure for unethical but nonsanctionable conduct could also be revived. It does not seem likely, however, that le ers of reprimand could function as a mainstream alternative to debarments; the principle of proportionality demands that the use of such a light sanction should be limited to minor forms of misconduct.
Voluntary Disclosure Program (VDP)
The VDP provides another possible alternative to debarment. Under the VDP, fi rms not already under investigation may be spared sanction if they meet certain conditions, including self-investigation, implementation of integrity compliance, and a fi rm commitment to avoid sanctionable practices in the future.53 In the course of public consultations, private sector actors expressed dissatisfaction with what they perceived to be onerous terms and conditions, in particular the 10-year mandatory debarment for breach of VDP terms.54 As a result, fi rms’ participation in the VDP has so far not met initial expectations
49 See Sanctioning Guidelines, supra note 4, at sec. II.F.
50 See supra note 41.
51 See Leroy & Fariello, supra note 26, at 10.
52 As of FY 2013, three le ers of reprimand have been issued, all of them in the context of se lement.
53 See World Bank, Voluntary Disclosure Program Guidelines for Participants (2011), h p://
go.worldbank.org/T3PD4EE550. See also Stevens & Delonis, supra note 34, at 406–7, which allows that “[t]he VDP is not an appropriate fi t for everyone.”
54 See supra note 7.
and—for the moment at least—cannot be seen as a viable mainstream alterna- tive to debarment.55
Referral to National Authorities
Although the Bank’s sanctions system aims at preventing bad actors from participating in future projects through its sanctions, criminal investigations remain within the jurisdiction of member-states. The Bank has had a long- standing practice of referring investigative fi ndings to national authorities when an investigation leads INT to believe that the laws of a member country have been broken. Following a 2009 recommendation by a panel led by Paul Volcker,56 the Bank undertook to make these referrals on a routine basis.
In theory, the deterrent component of sanctions could be served by this kind of referral. Indeed, the prospect of action (typically of a criminal nature) by national law enforcement could be a far more potent deterrent than the economic and reputational price exacted by a Bank sanction. However, this assumes that a referral is likely to lead to real consequences; the track record so far in terms of follow-up by national authorities is not very encouraging. In FY 2012, the World Bank made 46 referrals of fi ndings to agencies and author- ities in more than 30 countries. In FY 2013, only 10 referrals prompted national authorities to launch their own investigations.57
Community Service as Restitution
Despite its drawbacks, debarment continues to dominate the Bank’s sanctions system, partly because the Bank’s Sanctioning Guidelines enshrine it as the baseline sanction, partly because the potential alternatives to debarment have faced their own sets of issues.
One promising and innovative idea for an alternative (or complement) to debarment is the adoption of various forms of community service. For the purposes of this chapter, the term “community service” is used broadly, with a meaning that captures the provision of goods, works, or services to a com- munity of stakeholders, preferably those who were aff ected by the corrupt behavior that gave rise to the sanction.
Community Service in National Law
Community service as a form of penalty for individuals has a long history in penal law. In its earliest days, it took the form of penal servitude and, later,
55 In fairness, it should be noted that these kinds of results appear to plague leniency programs generally, including in the FCPA context. See, generally, Søreide, supra note 30.
56 Paul A. Volcker et al., Independent Panel Review of the World Bank Group Department of Institu- tional Integrity, paras. 81 et seq. (Sept. 13, 2007), h p://go.worldbank.org/VVY6KYS720.
57 See 2012 and 2013 INT Annual Reports, supra note 31.
as a formal sentencing option in lieu of incarceration.58 Discussions about the adaptation of this form of sentence for use against corporate off enders have occurred only recently. The assumption is that imposing community ser- vice orders on corporate respondents would be superior to imposing fi nes in regards to the fi ve major aims of corporate criminal law: deterrence, direction, instruction, retribution, and redress.59 In the United States, sentencing guide- lines provide that community service may be ordered as a condition of proba- tion where the service is reasonably designed to repair the harm caused by the off ense, provided that the organization performs the service only by employ- ing its resources or paying its employees or others to do so. An order that an organization perform community service is viewed as “an indirect monetary sanction [. . .] generally less desirable than a direct monetary sanction” and is warranted where “the convicted organization possesses knowledge, facilities, or skills that uniquely qualify it to repair damage caused by the off ense.”60 Community Service in the World Bank Sanctions Context
Although community service comes out of penal law traditions, the authors would argue that it can fi nd a place in the World Bank’s administrative sys- tem and—perhaps paradoxically—help shift the system away from its current focus on negative incentives toward more positive ones.
A fi rm found to have engaged in corrupt acts could undertake to “give back” to the community aff ected by its misconduct, either by undoing the harm caused by the misconduct or, if that is impractical, engaging more gen- erally in the provision of goods, works, or services to benefi t that community.
To take a straightforward case, a fi rm that “cut corners” on a road it built by
58 Malcolm M. Feeley, Richard Berk, & Alec Campbell, Between Two Extremes: An Examination of the Effi ciency and Eff ectiveness of Community Service Orders and Their Implications for the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 155, 156 (1992) (examining community service as a form of sentencing in light of the relative severity of the sanctions, the issues surround- ing implementation, and the question of deterrence). See also Gordon Bazemore & Dennis Maloney, Rehabilitating Community Service toward Restorative Service Sanctions in a Balanced Justice System, 58 Fed. Probation 24 (1994); and David C. Anderson, Sensible Justice: Alterna- tives to Prison (New Press 1998). For a comparative analysis and use of community service in Europe, see Gill McIvor, Kristel Beyens, Ester Blay, & Miranda Boone, Community Service in Belgium, the Netherlands, Scotland, and Spain: A Comparative Perspective, 2 Eur. J. Probation 82, 83 (2010) (submi ing that community service should be regarded as “one of the most suc- cessful late modern punishments” that evolved from a purely rehabilitative “measure” to a punishing community “penalty”).
59 Brent Fisse, Community Service as a Sanction against Corporations, 1981 Wis. L. Rev. 970, 1004 (1981) (also submi ing that community services orders on corporate off enders should be formal sanctions, rather than conditions of probation, mitigation of sentence, or nonprosecu- tion). See also Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for Rehabilitation, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1417 (2009); and Marti Flacks, Combining Retribution and Reconciliation:
The Role of Community Service Sentencing in Transitional Justice, 1 Interdisc. J. Hum. Rights L.
1 (2006) (arguing that community service sentencing could complement or replace prosecu- tion in that “it falls in the unique position of being a mechanism of both retributive and restorative justice”).
60 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, Guidelines Manual, ch. 8, sec. B1.3., “Community Service: Orga- nizations (Policy Statement)” (Nov. 1, 2013).
building the road to only 75 percent of its intended width would repair or reconstruct the road to the original specifi cations, even in the absence of con- tractual remedies available to the borrower to demand full performance. In the alternative, if the road was built to specifi cations but its price was infl ated, community service could return to the intended benefi ciaries the value of that excess cost. In less straightforward cases, where the nexus between the cor- rupt act and harm is more a enuated due to the lapse of time or the wide- spread nature of the corruption, the community service could be aimed more broadly at the project benefi ciaries where the corruption took place or to the broader community, region, or country(ies) aff ected.
Within the existing set of Bank sanctions, satisfactory performance of this sort of community service could be deemed either a form of in-kind restitu- tion or simply a condition for non-debarment.61 Farther upstream, an off er of community service could be considered as cooperation in mitigation or avoid- ance of debarment.
Advantages of Community Service
The concept of community service is particularly a ractive to a development institution such as the World Bank because the concept holds a sanctioned party to account in a way that directly addresses the harm that corruption does to development eff ectiveness, thus contributing directly to the Bank’s mandate. And it avoids collateral consequences for Bank procurement and for the markets in which the sanctioned party operates.
Direct engagement with the aff ected communities could potentially give communities greater voice on the governance challenges aff ecting them and enhance accountability for the corrupt actor. The communities could, for example, be consulted on the extent of the harm suff ered and on how that harm could be put right, as a key input into designing an appropriate com- munity service action plan. The sanctioned party, for its part, could be called on to explain and apologize for its actions, thus holding it to account more powerfully than any mere fi nancial penalty could. This, in turn, may open up a broader dialogue on the conditions that made the corruption possible—and what could be done about them.62
61 While well within the spirit of the language, to be used as a form of restitution, the Bank’s Sanc- tioning Guidelines should probably be adjusted to allow explicitly for nonmonetary forms of restitution. The current language, which talks about “fi nancial remedies” and “amounts to be restituted,” appears to assume that restitution will come in the form of a payment.
62 In an eff ort to promote a culture of compliance, a proposal by external stakeholders as part of the sanctions review was made to include as a sanction the obligation to fi nance collective actions to prevent corruption (e.g., conferences, forums, business associations, school pro- grams) in the country where the corrupt act took place and with the active participation of the administration that was involved in the corrupt act. See Review of the World Bank Group Sanctions System, Submission of the French Council of Investors in Africa, Paris (Oct. 28, 2013), h p://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE/Resources/SanctionsReview_CIAN.pdf.
Community service may also be a way to overcome a number of the challenges posed by fi nancial forms of restitution discussed in this chapter.
Community service does not require a precise calculation of illicit profi t or damages or the precise identifi cation of a victim or victims, which can be slip- pery concepts. And it avoids the need to return funds to a government agency that may have been complicit in the original wrongdoing.
More broadly, the introduction of community service into the system could help shift the system away from its current focus on negative incentives toward a system that rewards good behavior while promoting the delivery of development results. The need to revisit the balance between the negative and positive incentives in the system was raised during recent external consulta- tions, where a number of stakeholders advocated a shift to encouraging or rewarding integrity; rehabilitation, including self-cleaning; and other correc- tive measures. More broadly, many external stakeholders maintained that the system is too punitive, too focused on negative incentives like debarment, and too li le focused on positive incentives like rewarding integrity, rehabilita- tion, and self-cleaning.63
Challenges of Community Service
Community service as a form of restitution comes with its own set of chal- lenges. As a threshold issue, the Bank would need to consider what forms of service would be appropriate, presumably with corrective actions that restore the status quo ante as the preferred option. The Bank would agree with the sanctioned party on an action plan, including activities and a timetable, which would then need to be monitored and assessed. Triggers and consequences would need to be articulated for late, poor, or nonperformance, with the ulti- mate consequence presumably being debarment, with some fl exibility for force majeure and other justifying circumstances. Indeed, this form of sanc- tion would, in essence, require a new contract, albeit one that provides goods, works, or services free of charge, with all the usual complexities a endant to contracts, beginning with the threshold issue of who the parties to the contract should be: the Bank, the relevant borrower, the aff ected line agency, or the community(ies) impacted—or a combination of these.
The legalities of the arrangement under local law would have to be con- fi rmed. For example, nonpayment notwithstanding, the arrangement could be seen as a form of public procurement, with all the concomitant constraints.
63 World Bank, Review of the World Bank Group Sanctions System, Global Multi-Stakeholder Con- sultations, Phase I: July–October 2013, Feedback Summary, h p://siteresources.worldbank.org /INTLAWJUSTICE/Resources/FeedbackSummaryPhaseI.pdf. For a discussion on the self- cleaning concept, see Sue Arrowsmith et al., Self-Cleaning: An Emerging Concept in EC Public Procurement Law?, in Self-Cleaning in Public Procurement Law (Carl Heymanns 2009) (arguing that contractors adopting certain self-cleaning measures should be allowed to participate in public procurement and avoid debarment); and Roman Majtan, The Self-Cleaning Dilem- ma: Reconciling Competing Objectives of Procurement Processes, 45 Geo. Wash. Intl. L. Rev. 291 (2013) (arguing that it is possible to improve integrity while increasing competition through a more fl exible approach toward debarment that uses restitution and other means).
