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Thư viện số Văn Lang: One Hundred Years of Chemical Warfare: Research, Deployment, Consequences

Nguyễn Gia Hào

Academic year: 2023

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Only at the end of the war were several British and American gas officers able to comment on the impact of chemical warfare. What underpinned the development of gas warfare was the search for more effective chemical warfare agents. 14In this context, historian Jay Winter emphasizes a "community in European cultural life in the wake of the war" (Winter1995, 227).

The Genie and the Bottle: Reflections on the Fate of the Geneva Protocol in the United States. In the aftermath of the war, the American scientific community gained unprecedented recognition and public acceptance. The early 1920s offered cause for both hope and fear—the twin legacies of the Enlightenment.

Bernal, saw in the outcome of the protocol debate new reason to reconsider the politics of science. Simulation of disease after gas attacks became a particular problem for the German prosecution of the war. So the simple soldier did not share in the enthusiasm of the experts, the military commanders and the politicians from the beginning.

Fig. 1 Ferdinand-Joseph Gueldry, Le ravin de la mort à Verdun, 1916
Fig. 1 Ferdinand-Joseph Gueldry, Le ravin de la mort à Verdun, 1916


At the end of October 1942, Sievers first ordered 20 g of LOST from the Waffen-SS for Hirt.35 In mid-November, Hirt's assistant Karl Wimmer established a laboratory in Natzweiler and began selecting prisoners as test subjects for experiments.36 The first LOST experiment, carried out on November 25 1942 on 15 prisoners, failed because the agent provided by the Waffen-SS proved ineffective.37 In early December 1942, Hirt continued experiments with a second delivery of LOST,38 which did not, however, proceed as expected. 39 The results of the animal tests did not apply to humans: unlike the experiments on rats, the human experiments carried out on prisoners showed that treatment with vitamin A apparently did not result in protection, but on the contrary, i.e. hypersensitivity.40 At the end of January 1943, Sievers and Hirt discussed in Natzweiler and Dachau the expansion of the LOST experiments in both concentration camps. His report did not mention the circumstances of the experiments carried out on the prisoners in the concentration camps or the suffering of the victims. Since 1939, Bickenbach has been researching possible treatments for the effects of the poisonous gas phosgene (COCl2), which was used in combat during the First World War.

Because of the results of animal testing, Bickenbach considered Urotropin "a very efficient protector against the symptoms of suffocation caused by phosgene poisons."46 At the conference organized by the SS-Ahnenerbe, Bickenbach showed the film that he had shot himself to documented Phosgene experiments conducted on cats and monkeys until 1940.47 Consequently, Sievers suggested that Bickenbach continue his experiments "in conjunction" with Hirt in Natzweiler.48 Bickenbach agreed to the collaboration with. In early April 1943 Sievers asked camp commandant Josef Kramer about the exact spatial volume of the gas chamber under construction there, so that Bickenbach could calculate the gas concentration and thus the dose of phosgene required for the human experiments.49 On 12 April 1943 Kramer reported that the gas chamber was now "complete" and had "a spatial volume of 20 cubic meters".50 In mid-September 1942 Bickenbach agreed to cooperate with a working group at the Institute for Military Scientific Research.51 Two days after received the news about the operative. Natzweiler gas chamber, Sievers personally reported to Himmler the results of Hirt's LOST experiments so far. In 1946, the camp's gas chamber was technically examined by a French commission of experts.

In 1944, Natzweiler's gas chamber was used again for several test series with phosgene. 55 Helmut Rühl, Bickenbach's assistant, was responsible for measuring the concentration of phosgene in correlation with the humidity of the gas chamber. 56 Rühl began work on the construction of the measuring device in January 1944, but had problems with instrument calibration.57 The measurement method used by Rühl was developed by Wolfgang Wirth, head of the Institute of Pharmacology and Military Toxicology of the Military Medical Academy in Berlin (Wirth 1936). Wirth visited Rühl in Strasburg and gave him advice on the final setup of the instruments before the final series of phosgene experiments began at Natzweiler.58 Although we do not know how much Wirth learned about the experiments conducted at the Natzweiler concentration camp, his technical support can be understood as further. 55 The execution of the experimental series was delayed due to a dispute between Hirt and Bickenbach, see Schmaltz.

Hirt and Bickenbach followed the next day and began the phosgene experiments that ended on August 8, 1944. 20 prisoners received injections and a "control group" of eight prisoners remained "unprotected".61 Apart from some "preventive detention" German prisoners, most of the test victims were transferred by the SS from the "Gypsy Camp" Auschwitz-Birkenau. to Natzweiler. Willy Herzberg, one of the survivors, told how Bickenbach himself led the prisoners into the gas chamber, where he smashed vials filled with phosgene on the ground. All four prisoners (Zirko Rebstock, 37; Adalbert Eckstein, 20; Andreas Hodosy, 32 and Josef Reinhardt, 38), who died at the end of the last test series, were German Sinti—thus indicating a systematic selection of victims based on racist criteria for the most dangerous experiment.

In his final report to Karl Brandt in 1944, Bickenbach explained in detail the extent to which the limit values ​​of the lethal effects of phosgene poisoning could be reduced with Urotropin.64 The phosgene experiments at Natzweiler show that human experiments, which were unethical and no doubt the medical crime of war can still produce new scientific knowledge. Transgressing ethical boundaries, making the death of test subjects an integral part of the epistemology of. 59 When questioned in 1947, Wirth claimed that he had not heard of the phosgene experiments at Natzweiler before the Nuremberg war crimes trials (Woelk2003, 282).


Otto Bickenbach's human experiments with chemical warfare agents in the Natzweiler concentration camp in connection with the SS-Ahnenerbe and the Reichsforschungsrat. Chemical Weapons Research in National Socialism: The Collaboration of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institutes with the Military and Industry. This essay examines Japan's CW policy in China and the Pacific Theater during World War II and argues that the enemy's perceived ability to retaliate in kind was the primary factor in determining the Japanese use of chemical weapons.

In Japan, military interest in chemical weapons began with reports of the use of poison gas at Ypres on April 22, 1915. However, research and development of chemical weapons was not given high priority at this time, as Japan was not a major belligerent. in the war and did not have the relative urgency of other participants. According to a U.S. military intelligence report, Narashino was “superbly equipped, well equipped, and effective in accomplishing its mission by the end of the year.

5 Office of the Chief Chemical Officer, GHQ, AFPAC, Tokyo, Japan, "Intelligence Report on Japanese Chemical Warfare," vol. As a result, interrogations of senior military personnel served as one of the main sources of information and played a key role in the investigation. 34According to the report of the Chief Chemical Officer, the Japanese were even prepared to overlook minor local tactical use by the Allies in order to avoid general gas warfare […albeit].

After the Battle of "Bloody Tarawa" in November 1943, the head of the US Chemical Warfare Service, General William N. Porter, argued for the use of poison gas against the remaining Japanese forces in the Pacific. Others argued that the military advantages of using CW against Japan in the Pacific far outweighed any liability once Germany was out of the war. Project SPHINX: The question of the use of gas in the planned invasion of Japan. The Journal of Strategic Studies.

Yet, without precedent, international readiness to legally sanction violations of the Geneva Protocol—as with the. Much of the history of war in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was shaped by the great tension between advanced mechanized warfare and the idealistic enterprises that arose to stem its increasingly catastrophic impact. The 1922 establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in The Hague offered the option for member states to settle their disputes through legal hearings, which they did, at a rate of five cases per year for the next decade ( ICC 2012).

Compared to the spirit of the immediate post-World War I years, the zeal for arms control in 1945 was notably lacking. In mid-May, Morrow was informed of the content of Beebe's interrogation and the argument for "the prohibited use of poison gas" was deleted from the "All China Military Aggression" report.

Hình ảnh

Fig. 1 Ferdinand-Joseph Gueldry, Le ravin de la mort à Verdun, 1916
Fig. 3 Gas attack photographed from the air, Imperial War Museum London
Fig. 2 Georges Leroux, L ’ enfer, 1921, Imperial War Museum London
Fig. 4 Otto Dix, Lichtsignale, 1917

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