HUMAN RESOURCES AND ORGANIZATIONAL
Annex 2.C Checklist for
Autonomous Revenue Agencies
The issue is frequently raised as to whether trans-forming an existing customs organization into an ARA should be considered as part of the solution to modernizing a customs administration in a given country. When considering this option, it is worth-while to contemplate the following issue: What major reasons prevent customs from attaining its objectives as effectively and efficiently as desired?
The response to this question will be derived from the diagnostic study.
The major advantage that an ARA provides is greater autonomy in matters of human resources (salaries, staff renewal at the outset to ensure that the desired skill mix is available, career manage-ment from recruitmanage-ment through retiremanage-ment) and in the determination of its budgetary envelope, and the ease with which these resources can be used both for recurrent and investment purposes.
To the extent that the shortcomings of a customs administration derive from these issues it will be
important to see if, within the specific country cir-cumstances, the promises of an ARA can be real-ized. The issues to consider include the following:
• Is the political support present to engage in staff renewal at the outset? This may include declar-ing all positions vacant and recruitdeclar-ing new staff in a transparent manner.
• Is it possible to introduce a credible and trans-parent method to select those that the new administration wants to attract?
• Are there financial resources available to provide termination packages for staff not selected for the new organization?
• What are the chances that a different and higher salary scale will be provided to the staff of the ARA and that this pay differential with the other civil services will be sustained? What is the power of the civil service unions—or of similar organizations—to prevent such differentiation in compensation?
• What are the chances that the necessary finan-cial resources will be forthcoming and sustained to permit the payment of salary premiums to ARA staff?
• Would the MOF be willing to grant the financial autonomy implied by an ARA? Would this extend to the investment budget?
• Is there a tradition of micromanagement and interference by the MOF that could impede the independence of the ARA?
• What assurance is there that the board of the ARA will have sufficient autonomy to make the necessary decisions beneficial to the operation of the ARA?
• Is the process of selecting the board and the ARA manager likely to provide good managers?
If these shortcomings are derived from other issues such as lack of automation, major integrity prob-lems, or complex and nontransparent procedures, then it will be important to see to what extent
• new and independent management will tackle these issues
• international donor organizations are willing to assist the ARA in its initial years to engage in these basic reform issues, either with advice or with financial support
• the likelihood exists that the proposed ARA management either has a modernization vision or will be open to acquiring such a vision.
Clearly, if the motive for the introduction of the ARA rests solely on the possibility of providing higher salaries to ARA staff, it is unlikely that the creation of an ARA will promote the moderniza-tion agenda.
Further Reading
Castro, Patricio, and James T. Walsh. 2003. “The Organization of Customs Administration.” In Michael Keen, ed.Changing Customs: Challenges and Strategies for the Reform of Customs Administration. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
De Wulf, Luc. 2004. “Salary Bonuses in Revenue Departments:
Do They Work?” PREM Note 84. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge, Ivar Kolstad, and Siri Lange. 2003. Auton-omy, Incentives and Patronage, A study in Corruption in the Tanzania and Uganda Revenue Authorities. Development Stud-ies and Human Rights. Michelsen Institute. Oslo, Norway.
www.cmi.no/publications/publication.cfm?pubid=1688.
Taliercio, Robert. 2004. “Administrative Reform as Credible Commitment: The Impact of Autonomy on Revenue Authority Performance in Latin America.”World Develop-ment32(2): 213–32.
References
The word processeddescribes informally reproduced works that may not commonly be available through libraries.
Administration des Douanes et Impôts Indirects. 2001. La Douane Marocaine a Travers l’Histoire. Rabat.
Castro, Patricio, and James T. Walsh. 2003. “The Organization of Customs Administration.” In Michael Keen, ed.Changing Customs, Challenges and Strategies for the Reform of Customs Administration.Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
De Wulf, Luc. 2004. “Salary Bonuses in Revenue Departments:
Do They Work?” PREM Note 84. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Fjeldstad, Odd-Helge, Ivar Kolstad, and Siri Lange. 2003. Auton-omy, Incentives and Patronage, A study in Corruption in the Tanzania and Uganda Revenue Authorities. Development Studies and Human Rights, Michelsen Institute, Oslo, Norway.
www.cmi.no/publications/publication.cfm?pubid=1688.
Hubbard, Michael, Simon Delay, and Nick Devas. 1999. “Com-plex Management Contracts: The Case of Customs Adminis-tration in Mozambique.”Public Administration and Develop-ment. 19(2):153–163.
IDB (Inter-American Development Bank). 2001. “Institutional-izing Human Resources Management in Bolivia’s Customs Administration.” In Customs Best Practices in East Asia and Latin America.Washington, D.C.
Mwangi, Anthony. 2004. “Mozambique.” In Luc De Wulf and José B. Sokol, eds.Customs Modernization Initiatives: Case Studies.Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
PLS RAMBOLL. 2001.Supporting Institutional Reforms in Tax and Customs: Integrating Tax and Customs Administrations.
Study prepared for the World Bank and supported by the Danish Governance Trust Fund. Washington, D.C.
www1.worldbank. org/publicsector/tax/Taxandcustoms-finalreport.doc.
Steenlandt, Marcel, and Luc De Wulf. 2004. “Customs Pragma-tism and Efficiency: Philosophy of a Successful Reform:
Morocco.” In Luc De Wulf and Jose Sokol, eds.Customs Modernization Initiatives: Case Studies. Washington D.C.:
World Bank.
Talierco, Robert. 2002. Designing Performance: The Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authorities in Africa and Latin America.
draft. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Processed.
———. 2004.Organizational Design Profiles of Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authorities in Developing Countries. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/tax/
autonomy.html.
Therkildsen, Ole. 2003. “Revenue Authority Autonomy in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case of Uganda.” Paper presented at the Workshop on Taxation, Accountability and Poverty at the Annual Conference of the Norwegian Association for Development Research (NFU) “Politics and Poverty.” Oslo.
October 23–24.
Van Rijckeghem, C. V., and B. Weber. 1997. “Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?” Working Paper WP97/73. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
51