Bibliography
V. Conclusion
Continued Challenges—Recommendations
To address judicial corruption, reforms could focus on strengthening anticorruption mechanisms within the judiciary, as well as on responding more effectively to those who bring cases of corruption before the courts. Building capacity among the judi-cial sector’s main actors to investigate and sanction corruption, including of volun-tary disclosure programs, and implementing public information campaigns to disseminate the results of such work will go a long way in demonstrating the politi-cal will that Peruvian society perceives as lacking in the judicial sector generally, and in the judiciary branch specifically.
Disciplinary bodies within the sector, such as the National Judicial Council, and internal controls such as the OCMA could be equipped with effective investigative tools enabling those bodies to track down responsible actors and sanction them for acts of corruption, or to request indictment by the attorney general’s office. An effec-tive investigation also includes coordination among public entities, brought about as interinstitutional coordination mechanisms are established and strengthened.
La Forgia, G.M. 2003. “In Search of Excellence. Strengthening Hospital Perfor-mance in Brazil.” Concept paper (unpublished), March 19. LCSHH, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Latinobarómetro. 2005. En <
www.latinobarometro.org
>.Mackay, Keith. 2005. Discussant notes, LAC Regional M&E Conference, June 6–7 World Bank, Washington, DC.
Martínez, R. 2002. La fórmula electoral de doble vuelta en Sudamérica, Centroamérica y el Caribe.Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca.
Nash, Schooner, and O’Brien. 1998. The Government Contract Reference Book. Sec-ond Edition. Washington, DC: George Washington University.
Pachano, Simón. 1997. “Bucaram, ¡fuera! Bucarama ¿fuera?.” En Varios autores. ¿Y ahora qué? Una contribución al análisis político-histórico actual. Quito: Eskeletra Editions.
PROÉTICA (Consejo Nacional para la Ética Pública). Capítulo Internacional de Transparencia Internacional. En:
www.proetica.org.pe
.Ricciuti, R. 2004. “Political Fragmentation and Fiscal Outcomes.” Public Choice 118: 365–388.
Samuels, David. 2000. “Fiscal Horizontal Accountability? Toward a Theory of Bud-getary ‘Checks and Balances’ in Presidential Systems.” Conference on Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies. University of Notre Dame, May.
Santiso, Carlos. 2005. “Politics of Budgeting in Peru: Legislative Budget Oversight and Public Finance Accountability in Presidential Systems.” At: http://www.
sais-jhu.edu/workingpapers/WP-01-04.pdf. Accessed on October 30, 2005.
Tuesta Soldevilla, Fernando. 1994. Perú político electoral.Lima: Fundación Friedrich Ebert.
Wise, Carol. 2003. Reinventando el Estado: Estrategia económica y cambio institu-cional en el Perú.Lima: Universidad del Pacífico.
World Bank Institute. 2001. “Voices of the Misgoverned and Misruled: An Empiri-cal Diagnostic Study on Governance, Rule of Law and Corruption for Peru.
Analysis of Survey Feedback by Peruvian Citizens, Firms and Public Officials.”
Julio. World Bank Institute, Washington, DC.
Websites visited:
National Jury of Elections, Peru (legislation):
http://www.jne.gob.pe/archivos/ley28094.pdf.
http://www.jne.gob.pe/contenidos_iframe/informacion_legal/leyes.php?ley=26859.
Peruvian Congress (law projects):
http://www2.congreso.gob.pe/Sicr/TraDocEstProc/CLProLey2001.nsf.
http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/Imagenes/Leyes/28617.pdf.
Constitutional Court (jurisprudence):
http://www.tc.gob.pe/jurisprudencia/2006/00030-2005-AI.html.
Asociación Civil Transparencia:
http://www.transparencia.org.pe.
Universidad of Lima:
http://www.ulima.edu.pe/webulima.nsf/default/gopbs?OpenDocument&dn=7.1.
Table A.1. Matrix of Policy Recommendations
Recommendation Short-Term Actions Medium-Term Actions Long–Term Actions
1. New Role Budgetary institutions and Budgetary institutions and Budgetary institutions and
of Congress role of Congress: role of Congress: role of Congress:
and Budgetary •Elaborate a plan for institutional • Institutionalize exchange on performance • Exchange information on quality Institutions strengthening of technical offices. and quality of expenditures in one of expenditures in several sectors.
M&E: pilot sector. M&E:
• Define a pilot sector for testing • Require mandatory assessment of • Implement full results-based
M&E. fiscal impact of laws. budget management in pilot sector.
• Refine concept of M&E; M&E: • Expand M&E to other sectors at
establish indicators for pilot sector. • Apply M&E to one pilot sector at the the level of commitments, then level of annual commitments. fully results-based.
• Establish link with budgetary decisions.
• Report to Congress, civil society.
2. Civil Service Civil service: Civil service: Civil service:
• Identify labor debt in view of • Issue norms for hiring at the level of • Implement management contracts decentralization. departmental governments. in one sector (health) that are fully
• Elaborate a concept for future role • Adopt and implement legal reform for role results-based.
of sector directors in departments. of sector directors in departmental Pensions:
Pensions: governments for clear lines of responsibility. • Put complementary systems of
• Reduce arrears. • Pilot the use of results-based management private and public pensions in
• Eliminate exemptions for education contracts in one sector (health) at the level place (avoid competition between
and health payroll. of annual commitments. two systems).
• Elaborate a concept for financial Pensions:
audits. • Clear arrears.
• Carry out audits and establish and enforce sanctions.
ANOPPORTUNITYFORADIFFERENTPERU: PROSPEROUS, EQUITABLE, ANDGOVERNABLE
: A STRATEGYFORSTATEREFORM85 complementarity among subnational sector.
and national M&E as well as • Establish and enforce sanctions for
accreditation. noncompliance; apply also to
manage-ment agreemanage-ments (convenios de gestión).
4. Judicial •Elaborate an operational plan for • Strengthen capacity of the judiciary • Scale up voluntary disclosure Corruption judicial strengthening, based on the sector to combat corruption internally. programs.
National Plan for Integrated • Build capacity to investigate and • Have in place fully effective
Judicial Reform. sanction corruption. interinstitutional coordination
• Pilot voluntary disclosure programs. mechanisms.
• Implement public information campaigns.
Endnotes
1. The figure depicts the percentile rank of Peru on two of the five governance indicators used by the World Bank Institute. Percentile rank indicates the percentage of countries world-wide that rate below the selected country (subject to margin of error). The governance indica-tors reflect the statistical compilation of responses on the quality of governance given by a large number of enterprise, citizen, and expert survey respondents from developing and indus-trialized countries, as reported by a number of survey institutes, think tanks, nongovernmen-tal organizations, and international organizations. For a detailed description of the indicators, the sources of information, and the methodology, see http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/gover nance/index.html.
2. The establishment of the Consulta Amigable—an Internet portal managed by the MEF that makes available timely and disaggregated budget and public expenditure information to the public—was an important achievement in increasing public financial transparency.
3. Following increased fiscal pressures during 2005, several exemptions to the fiscal respon-sibility laws are being debated.
4. There was a slippage in the rules for fiscal responsibility in 2005.
5. For notes on the 2005 LAC Regional M&E Conference, see Mackay 2005. Also see Guzmán.
6. Fiscal decentralization is discussed in Chapter 32.
7. According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index for 2005 (http://www.transparency.org/cpi/).
An Economy That Generates Jobs
■
Macroeconomic Stability
Abstract
Peru’s development in the last 45 years has been characterized by two disappointments:
low growth and persistent poverty. Per capita income grew by less than 0.75 percent a year on average, below the averages of Latin America, developed countries, and even developing countries. This low level of growth has been insufficient to bring down poverty rates and as of 2004 over half of Peru’s population lived on less than US$2 a day.
During the last five years the country has enjoyed economic stability, with average growth rates of 5 percent per year, low inflation, stable exchange rates, and both primary and nonprimary sectors sharing the overall dynamism. However, the growth effects on employment and poverty reduction have only recently been felt, and the most important question is how to ensure to ensure that growth is sustained for a longer period and trans-lated into faster poverty reduction. In this context, the incoming administration faces a choice. They can either continue with prudent fiscal and monetary programs while deep-ening structural reforms to increase productivity, or take a new direction and resort to market intervention and fiscal expansionist policies. The short-term effects of the second option could be positive, but history has shown that in the medium term these types of policies have failed to sustain growth and resulted in profound recessions. Although the first choice may generate less quick political support, it holds out the promise of sustain-ing high growth over many years, which history has shown is the only way to create major reductions in poverty.
Macroeconomic Framework for Sustainable Growth
Rossana Polastri
89
This chapter was prepared with the assistance of Norman Loayza and Linette Lecussan. Special thanks to Marco Ortiz for comments.